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STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
DOROTHY BEASLEY,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
11383

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
Appeal from a decision denying defendant's motion to
quash the jury panel and her conviction on the charge of
grand larceny.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant-Appellant was tried and convicted of the
crime of grand larceny. Defendant's trial and motion challengmg the jury were conducted before the Honorable John F.
Wahlquist in the Second Judicial Court. Sentence was imposed
for a term of not less than one nor more than ten years and the
defendant-appellant was placed on probation.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant respectfully requests the court to set aside
her conviction on the grounds that the jury which convicted
her was improperly selected in violation of Utah statutory enactments and the Utah and United States Constitutions.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 5, 1968, Dorothy Beasley, a Negro, was charg
ed with the crime of grand larceny, 7 6-38-4, U tab Code
Annotated, 19 53, as amended. Immediately prior to trial, defendant's attorney John Blair Hutchison moved to challenge
the jury panel on the following grounds:
1. That there were material departures from the
forms and statutes prescribed with respect to selecting.
drawing, and return of the jury panel.
2. That the forms and statutes prescribed with respect to selecting, drawing, and returning of the jury in
the state of Utah are unconstitutional.
The Honorable John F. Wahlquist, one of the Judges of
the District Court of Weber County, State of Utah, deferred
ruling on defendant's motion until after the case was tried on
its merits (T.T.l). On April 18, 1968, the defendant was convicted of the crime of grand larceny. Sentencing was deferred
until a hearing could be had and a ruling made on defendant\
motion (T.T. 104, 105 ).
On July 10, 1968, at the hearing on defendant's motion.
evidence was introduced which established the following facts:
That the jury commissioners limited jury participation to
those persons who had actually voted in the last election
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and who owned real property (H.T. 11, 72); that 60% of
the names appearing on the 1968 master jury list were
taken from the 1967 list (H.T. 48, 166); that proportionate representation, on the master jury list, was not
given to all areas of Weber County as required by statute
(H.T. 12, 32, 168); and that the Spanish American
community in Weber County is grossly underrepresented
on the master jury list (H.T. 28, 37, 107).
Judge Wahlquist ruled that the irregularities practiced by
the JUry commissioners of Weber County were not prejudicial,

ctnd denied defendant's motion. From that ruling and defendJnt's conviction, this appeal was taken.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
A METHOD OF SELECTING JURORS WHICH RESULTS lN A JURY WHICH DOES NOT REPRESENT A
FAIR CROSS SECTION OF THE COMMUNITY IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AND CONVICTIONS THEREBY CANNOT
STAND.
A. The defendant was guaranteed a right to trial by jury
under the laws of the state of Utah. Section 77-1-8 of the Utah
Code Annotated ( 19 53) provides, among other things, that the
defendant in a criminal prosecution has the right:
(6) To have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the county in which the offense is alleged to have been
committeed; ..... .
In this case the defendant was charged with grand larceny,
·-mying a maximum penalty of ten years' imprisonment and a
\l.OOO fine (U.C.A. 76-36-6, 1953), which gives her the right
t<J c1 trial by jury under the above section.

3

At this point it should be noted that the United States
Supreme Court recently held that the right to trial by jury, a1
guaranteed in criminal cases in the Federal Courts by Article
Ill of the United States Constitution and the Sixth Amendment, applies through the Fourteenth Amendment to State
Courts. Oufl~B v. Loajgana, _____ U.S. ____ , 20 L.Ed.
2d 491, 88 S.Ct. _ _ _ (1968). The Court limited the 6th
Amendment's application to crimes of a serious nature and
held that a crime with a possible penalty of two years in prison
was serious enough to justify application of the Sixth Amendment.
Based on the holding of the court in Dun~an, supra, it is
clear that the defendant in the case at bar would be guaranteed
a right to trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment.
B.
Inherent in the right to trial by jury in both State and
Federal Courts is the right to a jury drawn from a fair cross
section of the community. As early as 1880 the Supreme
Court held:
Trial by jury comtemplates a body of peers or equals of
the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to
determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associate,,
persons having the same legal status in society as that
which he holds. ~tr_'!.}-1_9er v. ~~_g_y_irgilli__<!_, 100 U.S. 303.
25 L.Ed. 664 (1880),
Again in Wa~ v. Uni!_~U_!_<!_!es, the Circuit Court of
Appeals stated:
Trial by jury necessarily contemplates an impartial jury
drawn from a cross section of the community, and tl11s
means that prospective jurors should be selected by court_
officials without systematic and intentional exclusion o!
any economic, social, religious, racial, political or geographical groups of the community. 356 F.2d 787 (U.S.
C.A., Dist. of Columbia 1965 ).
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The courts have uniformly 8aid that inherent in the right
to trial by jury is the right to be tried by a fair cross section of
the community. Ih~L v. South~_!!__}>3,.f.ific, 328 U.S. 217, 90
L.Ed. 1181 ( 1946); Her~_Ddez v. Tex~, 34 7 U.S. 4 7 5, 98 L.
Ed. 866, 74 S.Ct. 667 (1954); Eu~_Dks v._Staj_~Qf_Louisi~na,
356 U.S. 584, 2 L.Ed. 2nd 991, 78 S.Ct. 920 (1958); State v.
f}_Q~, 12 U. 2d 293, 365 P. 2d 798 (1961); Whitu2_ v.
(;~QT_g0, 385 U.S. 545, 17 L.Ed. 2nd 599 (1967).
No system of jury selection is constitutional which
systematically excludes any economic, social, religious, racial,
political or geographical group in the community. Wo_2ds v.
Munns, 347 F. 2d 948 (U.S.C.A. 10th Cir. 1965); Ware v.
lJ.!liteci_~~_l~, supra ( 1965); _Whit_!!~ v. Geo~_,_ supra.
Subsection 6 of Section 77-1-8, Utah Code Annotated
(19 53) guarantees an "impartial" jury. The objective of this
requirement is to insure the representative nature of the jury
and to protect against the exclusion of certain groups which
would prevent the jury lists from being drawn from a cross
section of the community. The rationale behind requirements
for properly selecting juries is succinctly stated by Mr. Justice
Murphy in ~lassor v. United_~tates, 315 U.S. 60, 85-86, 62 S.
Ct. 457, 472, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942):
Our notions of what a proper jury is have developed in
harmony with our basic concepts of a democratic society
and a representative government. For it is part of the
established tradition in the use of juries as instruments
of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community.
Section 77-1-8, supra, uses the same language as that
found in the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
Both guarantee an "impartial" jury. The term "impartial jury"
rnt.:ans one selected from a fair cross section of the community.
Stt~~ld~ v. We~ Virgi_f!!b 100 U.S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664 (1880);
\Vbit~ v. g~gr~ supra.
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Both the Federal Constitution and the laws of Utah re
quire that a jury be chosen from a fair cross section of the
community to satisfy the due process. Thus, the requirement
is fundamentally essential to an overall fair trial. Gi~_gll v.
Wainw~ight, 372 U.S. 335, 9 L.Ed. 2d 799 ( 1963); b'lJ!llQJ v.
tfogan, 378 U.S. 1, 12 L.Ed. 2d 653 ( 1964); Poi.J:i.L~ v. ]'~~a2 ,
380 U.S. 400, 13 L.Ed. 2d 923 (1965).

C.
The method of selection of the jurors for the master
jury list, together with the results obtained by the selection
process, must be examined to determine if the jury represents
a fair cross section of the community.
Courts have consistently struck down systems which rely
on segregated tax rolls as a basis for selecting a jury Ji,t.
~Q!:!:~ v. Alaba_rrl_ll, 294 U.S. 587, 79 L.Ed. 1074 (1935)
Arnold_ v. Nou_h_i=~!:._cl_i_r_i~, 376 U.S. 773, 12 L.Ed. 2d 77, 84
S.Ct. 1032 ( 1964); }Yhit_!!~ v. GeQ~, supra.
In the Federal Courts, system~ which have excluded wage
earners or women have been condemned. Thiel v. ~Q_u_thern
~~lfic, supra, Ballard v. Unit~_Sta~~ 329 U.S. 187, 91 L.Ed.
181 (1946).
Any jury system in which it can be shown that persom
are excluded because of race violates the Fourteenth Amend
ment. ~_r:_auder v. Weg_'{_i.!:gi~i'!.i supra, Hel'l1~.!!4_~ v. n_:~~i,_.
supra, Wh_i!us v. GeQT_g@, supra.
In Labat v. Bennett, 365 F. 2d 698 (U.S.C.A. 5th Cir.I
(1966), cl1e cour;-hcld~ where jury commissioners excluded
daily wage earners from jury lists in State Courts, that the ex
clusion resulted in prejudice to the Negro race, because of the
disproportionately high number of Negroes in the wage earn in~
ranks compared with other races.
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The Supreme Court has held that one does not have a
, 1 ~ltt to a representative from each group, which goes to make

JP the community, on the jury but that any system as it is set

up or operated should not result in the systematic exclusion of
)uch a class or group. Swai!l v. hlaJ?i!!!J._;!, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct.
82t 1 3 L.Ed. 2d 7 59 ( 1965)
Whenever it can be shown that a particular group is avail"ble for jury service and that no one from that group has been
chosen for several years to serve on a jury, the Supreme Court
ha' held that this constitutes a prima facie case of discrimindllon and the burden shifts to the State to justify the exclusion.
tl_o_l'_f!S v. hEJ?_;!ma, supra, E;:ttton v. Missisgf>Ei, 332 U.S. 463,
92 L.Ed. 76 (1947), HernaL!_s!_~ v. I~~~' supra.
It is also important to note that, in those cases upholding
the use of tax rolls as a basis for drawing jury lists, the courts
have pointed out the fact that such tax rolls included the names
1if owners of both real and personal property so as to give the
1ury commissioners a broad base from which to choose. Bro~_!}.
1. Allen. 344 U.S. 443, 97 L.Ed. 469, 73 S.Ct. 397 (1952),
1\c_t1_f[ v. S_~te, 283 P. 2d 856 (Oklahoma) (1955 ), Ro~c_b v.
Mall_c!_li!!_, 277 Fed. Supp. 54 (U.S.D.C., N.D. Georgia 1967).
In ~r.9~__!!. supra, the Supreme Court noted that all males
between the ages of 21 and 50 were required to pay a poll tax,
dlld that the tax rolls included both property, however modest,
and polls. The court went on to remark that the name of every
property owner and every voter was used in selecting the jury
list.
In B,g_~_b, supra. the District Court, in upholding a jury
\election system which relied on the tax rolls as a source of
names for the jury lists, was careful to point out that the tax
11,lls contained the names of all owners of real and personal
prnpcrty. 277 Fed. Supp. 54, 57 (1967).
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In Acuff v. State, ~lillra, the state statute specificall 1
provided that the tax rolls contain the names of both real and
personal property owners. 283 P. 2d 856, 863.
D. When Juries are unconstitutionally selected, convictions
handed down by them cannot stand.
The courts have been uniform in holding that when a jury
is unconstitutionally selected its verdict cannot stand, nu
matter how compelling the evidence. Wh_i!us v. Q~()!_g@, supra,
~!:9-2h v. Betg, 366 F. 2d 1 (U.S.C.A. 5 Cir. 1966 ); &<!_bjnowit~ v. Uniteci~l.<JJ~ 366 F. 2d 34 (U.S.C.A., 5 Cir 196(J),
Avery v. g~Q_~~, 345 U.S. 559, 97 L.Ed. 1244, 73 S.Ct. 891
(1952): E_<lj!_Q!1 v. Mi~~~£2L 332 U.S. 463, 469, 92 L.Ed. 76
(1947).

POINT II
THE JURY COMMISSIONERS IN WEBER COUNTY
r-:IA VE DEPRIVED THE JURY SYSTEM OF ITS INTENDED
BROAD BASE. THE YOUNG, THE POOR, AND THE NONPROPER TY OWNER ARE DISCRIMINATED AGAINST
Section 78-46-17 of the Utah Code Annotated ( 1953)
reads:
It shall be the duty of the jury commissioners before
the 15th day of December after their appointment to
select from the names of the kg_tl_y_gg_r~Q_fl_tb_~_<!_~~~~
m~JlLI_oll of the county for the current year a written
fist of the names from which the grand and trial jurors
shall be drawn to serve in the district court of such
county during the succeeding calendar year. In making
the selection they shall choose only those who are not
exempt from jury service, who are in possession of the1 1
faculties, who are not infirm or decrepit, who are well
informed and free from legal exceptions, <!l_l_d_~_f~r_a~
12@C t i~_Qk_,_~_b_Q_<!!:S'.__l1_Q!._L_~!!_Q1~Q_9_11 __th~_j\lI.Y.Ji~L o_f__tfil
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n~~_£.!:_e_s=_~ding_)"_~L· No person shall be selected as a juror
who is known to them to be interested in or has cause
pending which may be tried by a jury to be drawn from
persons so selected, or who, either personally or otherwise, has solicited his selection as such. (emphasis
supplied)

Based on this statute, the requirements for selection for
the master jury list are that a person be a legal voter and have
lus ndme appear on the assessment roll of the particular county
111 which the jury sits.
A. By limiting the definition of the term "legal voters",
as used in Section 76-46-17 U.C.A., to those persons who actually voted in the last general election, the jury commissioners
violated the plain intent of the statute and deprived the jury
wstem of its intended broad base.
The jury commissioners testified that the first prerequisite

for selection on the master jury list was that one must have

voted in the last general election (H.T. 72). To so limit eligibility for jury service violates the plain intent of the legislature and deprives the jury system of its intended broad base.
If the legislature wanted to limit eligibility for jury service to
'·actual voters", it would have been a simple task for them to
use that term rather than the term "legal voters".
The term "legal voters" refers to those who meet the
5tatutory and constitutional qualifications to vote. It is not
limited to those who actually vote. (H.T. 72, 288). Opinion
Q[_JJ~__nt~ti~~ 230 N.E. 2d 801 (Mass.) (1967); Bilek v.
City_Qf_i=_b~ago, 396 lll. 445, 71 N.E. 2d 789 (1947);
Wniht v. Lee, 125 N.J.L. 256, 15 A. 2d 610 (1940); ~~te v.
Bil\_1!~, 63 Or 277, 127 P. 686 ( 1912); Woodward v. Barker,
)9 Or 70,] 16 P.101 (1911). lnQJ2i.!1i@-91JJ.!~ fusti~J>, supra,
the rourt gave the following definition of "legal voters":
Persons who possess the constitutional qualifications to
be voters, and who have complied with statutory requirements so that they may lawfully cast votes at an election.
9

Evidence at the hearing on defendant's motion to (jU<isJ 1
the jury panel showed that those who voted in the last general election were primarily the older members of the community (H. T. 198, 221 ), and that fewer of the young and of
the minority groups actually vote in off presidential yeJr;
although many are registered (H. T. 152, 158, 159). By limit
ing eligibility for jury service to those who actually voted_
the jury commissioners violated the statutory mandate and
discriminated against the young, the poor, and the mino1 iry
groups in the community. Thus, the jury commissioners have
prevented the jury from being drawn from a fair cross section
of the community, as contemplated by the legislature.
B.
By limiting jury participation to those persons whose
names appear on the Real Property Index, the commissiunrn
have unlawfully narrowed the statutory language and thereby
excluded a large segment of the community from jury servict;.
The pertinent part of Section 78-46-17 U.C.A. (195J
provides that prospective jurors are to be selected from:
.. legal voters on the assessment roll ... "

1.

The term "assessment roll", as used in the above
statute, includes much more than just the real property part of the assessment roll.
Article XIII, Section 2, of the Utah Constitu
tion provides for the taxation, i.e., assessment, of all
tangible property in the state of Utah not exempt
under the laws of Utah or under Federal law. The
section goes on to exempt from taxation propert\
owned by government units, property used for reli
gious or charitable purposes, and certain propcrt\
of irrigation and power transmission facilities. lr
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further provides that the legislature may abate the
taxes of the poor, and provides for the exemption
of homesteads and other personal property. For the
extent to which the legislature has provided for such
exemptions, see Volume 6, Chapter 2, of U.C.A. as
amended (1953). Thus, it is clear that taxable tangible property includes all real and personal property.
Article XIII, Section 3, of the Utah Constitution provides for the assessment of tangible taxable
property. Section 59-5-4 of the Utah Code Annotated ( 19 53) enumerates the duties of the county
assessor in assessing such property, as follows:
The county assessor must, before the 15th day
of April of each year, ascertain the names of
all taxable inhabitants and all property in the
county subject to taxation except such as is
required to be assessed by the State Tax Commission and must assess such property to the
person by whom it was owned or claimed or
in whose possession or control it was, at 12: 00
o'clock noon of January next preceding ... "
Property which is required to be assessed by the
State is listed in Section 59-5-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953). It states:
Pipelines, power lines and plants, canals and
irrigation works, bridges and ferries, and the
property of car and transportation companies,
when they are operated as a unit in more than
one county; all property of public utilities
whether operated within one county or more;
all mines and mining claims ... , and all other
mines and mining claims . . . , and all other
mines and mining claims and other valuable
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deposits ... , all machinery used in mining and
all property or surface improvements upon ur
appurtenant to mines or mining claims ... :
must be assessed by the state tax commission
as hereafter provided. All taxable property not
required by the constitution or by law to be
assessed by the state tax commission must be
assessed by the county assessor of the several
counties in which the same is situated ...
Utah law further provides that the county assessor
shall assess real and personal property in the county
which is not assessed by the state tax commission
or exempted by the Utah Constitution, and !_9_deliver a roll of such assessment tQ the count_)'._JI_e~~
urer each~G_ U.C.A. 59-5-30 (1953)
It follows that an "assessment roll" as contemplated in the jury selection statute is not limited
to real property, but would also include personal
property, such as, automobiles, boats, house trailer>.
and various types of equipment used by persons in
business for themselves.
2.

By using only the real property part of the assessment rolls in drawing the master jury list, the commissioners have discriminated against the young,
the poor, and other non-real-property owners in the
community.
Bruce Jenkins, Weber County Assessor, testified
that all property both real and personal, not exempt under State law, was assessed and recorded on
rolls (H. T. 16). He further testified that the assessment roll was divided into two parts, one for real
property and one for personal property ( H. T. 231 ).
and that the complete assessment roll, listing both
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real and personal property, was available to the jury
commissioners if they wi:>hed to use it (H. T. 11,
27). The effective result of this practice is that all
non-real-property owners are automatically excluded from jury service by administrative fiat of the
Jury comm1ss1oners.
Every single name found on the master jury lists for
the years of 1965, 1966, 1967, and 1968, a total of
8,605 names, also appeared on the real property index for that same period (H. T. 160). Thus, by allowing only real property owners to serve on juries
you are taking the oldest and more affluent members of society who are buying houses by lease,
deed, mortgage transaction, ... and are excluding
the escrow purchasers, the young, and other persons (H. T. 190).
Moreover, the courts have sustained the use of tax
rolls as a basis for drawing jury lists only when such
rolls included both real and personal property, so
as to reflect a cross section of the community.
Brown v. Allen, supra; Roach v. Maudlin, supr<!_i
Acuff V. State, supra.
By limiting jury service to real property owners who
voted in the last general election, the jury commissioners of Weber County have discriminated against
the young adult, the poor, and the non-property
owners. Evidence of this is indicated by the fact
that of approximately 1,000 people polled, the
names of whom appeared on the 1968 master jury
list, only 134 gave their age as being under 40 years
of age (H. T. 163). This is in light of the fact that
Mr. Judkins from the Utah State Employment Of-
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fice testified that 25.7% of the total population in
Weber County consisted of persons between the
ages of 20 and 39 (H. T. 27). Also, as indicated before in this brief, all names appearing on the jury
lists were those of real property owners.
The jury commissioners in Weber County have
placed on jury service, restrictions never intended
by the legislature. As a result, the jury which tried
the defendant was not drawn from a cross section
of the community, and her conviction cannot stand.
C.
By copying 60% of the names on the 19 68 master jury list
from names that appeared on the list from the previous year.
the commissioners have violated their statutory duty as set
forth in 78-46-17, Utah Code Annotated (1953).
Section 78-46-17, Utah Code Annotated ( 19 53) provide,
in part that:
... in making the selection they [the jury commissioners I
shall choose only those who are not exempt from jury
service, who are in possession of their faculties, who are
well informed and free from legal exceptions, and, as far
as practicable, who are not returned on the jury of the
next preceding year.
Evidence at the hearing established that over 60% of the
names listed on the master jury list for 1968 were carried
over from the 1967 list (H. T. 166), and, in fact, the commissioners testified that they merely replaced the names of
persons who had been called for service in the preceding year

(H. T. 48).
The statute above cited places a duty on the commissioners to refrain, as far as practicable, from placing the same
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on the current master jury list which appeared on the
list of the previous year. The objective of this requirement is
to provide as large a segment of the citizenry as possible with
rhe opportunity of jury service; and, while the statute does
~;ant some flexibility to the jury commissioners, this does not
;ncan that they may use it to defeat the purpose of the pro.,·11ion. The term "as far as practicable", as used in the statute,
ivhc11 read in the context in which it appears, requires that the
ury commissioners refrain from using the same names year
Jftcr year. Moreover, there is no right given to copy names
directly from the previous year's master jury list. To allow
this practice would be to "lock in" certain individuals and
lilllit the chance of others in the community to sit on juries.
11 a111es

1

As the Supreme Court states in Gia~~_!:_ v. Uni!_~States,
'upra.

Tendencies, no matter how slight, toward the selection
uf jurors by any method other than a process which will
insure a trial by a representative group are undermining
processes weakening the institution of jury trial, and
~hould be sturdily resisted. That the motives influencing
such tendencies may be the best must not blind us to the
clangers of allowing any encroachment whatsoever on
this essentjal right. Steps innocently taken may one by
one lead to the irretrievable impairment of substantial
liberties.
Thus, when 60% of the names on the 1968 master jury
li1t were copied from the 1967 list, the list was compiled in
violation of the statutory requirement and is unconstitutional.
0
The jury commissioners unlawfully disregarded legisl1tive mandate designed to insure that each geographical area
rl the community be represented on the jury lists, and thereby rendered jury lists so drawn unconstitutional and in violation of Section 78-46-18, Utah Code Annotated (1953).
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Section 78-46-18, Utah Code Annotated (1953), in referring to the manner of choosing names for jury lists, provides, in part:
Names shall be selected as far as practicable from the
several precincts of the county in proportion to the number of votes cast therein.
The obvious object of the legislature in drafting this section was to insure that each geographical area would be represented on the master jury list, thereby insuring that any jury
chosen would be chosen from a list representative of the community as a whole.
The author asserts that the term "precinct" used in
the above statute is synonymous with "voting district". Section 20-3-2( d), Utah Code Annotated (19 53), in dealing with
definitions concerning primary elections defines the term precinct as one or more voting districts, while Section 1 7-16-5.
Utah Code Annotated (1953), defines precinct as a unit of
government. In light of such diversity of meaning the term
should be given the meaning its' context most suggests. The
context in which the term appears indicates that the legislature intended that it should act as an insurance that each area
of the community would be represented on the master jury
list, and with this in mind it is important to note that a precinct, as a unit of government, no longer exists in Weber
County, Therefore, to require that each precinct be proportionately represented would be form without substance. To
assume that each city constitutes a precinct would be to defeat the objective of the provision, in that the proportionate
number of jurors could be chosen from a city and still deny
representation to any geographical area in the city. The above
analysis indicates that the only definition which could be given to the term "precinct" which would be in line with the objective of this provision would be that of "voting district."
16

That the jury commissioners in Weber County failed to
comply with the provisions of this section is shown by the
Lid that voting districts 58, 59, and 60 in Ogden City had no
representative on the master jury list although they cast .4, .3,
Jnd .4 per cent of the total vote in Weber County, respectively
H. T. )2, 168). Moreover, there were persons in those districts ljUalified for jury service (H. T. 12). By way of contrast
die rown of Hooper, which cast only 1.3% of the total vote
(H. T. 32), had 41 persons represented on the list (H. T. 168).
According to statutory requirement, Hooper should be represented by no more than 30 persons on the master jury list;
and districts 58, 59, and 60 should have 9, 7, and 9 representatives on the master jury list, respectively.
The term "as far as practicable" as used in the statute
allows the commissioners to equate as near as practicable the
percentage of representation on the jury list with the percentage of the total vote cast by a particular district in the last
election. It in no way gives the commissioners the power to
vrbitrarily exclude one district and grossly over represent another. Thus, the jury commissioners in Weber County went
beyond the limited discretion allowed them by statute and
prevented the master jury list from representing a fair cross
1cct1on of the community as contemplated by the legislature.

POINT Ill
THE JURY COMMISSIONERS HAVE DISCRIMINATED ACAINST PERSONS OF SPANISH AMERICAN ORIGIN
IN ORA WING JURY LISTS, AND THEREFORE JURIES
DRAWN THEREFROM ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
CONVICTIONS BY THEM CANNOT ST AND.
!\

The courts have consistently held that any system which
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excludes a particular class of persons on the basis of race
from jury service, violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the
constitution of the United States.
Since 1880 the courts of this country have held that any
system which operates so as to exclude persons from jury
vice on the basis of race is unconstitutional. Str~l!_d~_r_ v. \Y_t:~t
Y!rg!Dg, supra; Akins v. Te~_2, 325 U.S. 398, 65 S. Ct. 1276.
89 L.Ed. 1695, (1945); Cassell v. Tex~, 339 U.S. 282, 7(1
S.Ct. 629, 94 L.Ed. 839 (1950); Whitu~ v. g~Q_I];@, supra.

se;

Although these cases speak in terms of "purpose to discriminate", and "intentional discrimination", they also recognize a positive, affirmative duty on the part of the jury commissioners and other state officials not to discriminate, and
indicate that it is not necessary to go so far as to establish ill
will, evil motive, or absence of good faith, but that objective
results are largely to be relied on in application of the Constitutional test.
B.
People of Spanish American ancestry constitute a class
within the community and are being unconstitutionally excluded from jury service.
The Supreme Court has indicated that the essential matters to be considered in determining if a systematic exclusion
of a certain class of jurors exists are:
That the class claimed to be excluded forms a substanti.~
segment of the population of the county, that some of
the class are qualified to serve as jurors, and that a mere
token or no members of the class have served on juries
over an extended period of time. Norr~ v. Ahi.l>~Ql~. 29..\
U.S. 587, 55 S.Ct. 579, 79 L. Ed. 1074 (1935), E_<!_!:!_L!~
v. Mis~_s_?_ip_pj_, 332 U.S. 463, 92 L.Ed. (1947).
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l.

People of Spanish American ancestry constitute a
separate class.
Statistics indicate that 10% of the population
of Ogden City have Spanish American surnames and
that about 5% of the population of Weber County
1s of Spanish American ancestry (H.T. 37, 28).
Courts have held under similar circumstances
that persons of Spanish American ancestry constituted a separate class within the community, the exclusion of which from jury service would render
such juries unconstitutional. Hernandez v. Texas,
supra; Montoya v. People, 14 Colo. 2d 9, 345 P. 2d
1062 (1959).

2.

There is a substantial number of persons of Spanish
American ancestry who are qualified to appear on
jury lists and act as jurors.
Section 78-46-17 of the Utah Code Annotated
indicates that the jury lists are to be drawn from the
legal voters on the assessment rolls.
Testimony at the hearing established that there
were 1,329 registered voters with Spanish American
surnames (H.T. 158) and that 364 persons on the
real property assessment rolls had surnames of
Spanish American origin (H.T. 95).

3.

Mere token inclusion of persons of Spanish American ancestry renders the 1968 jury list unconstitutional.
The courts have indicated that token summoning of a particular race or class would not meet
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constitutional requiremt>nts. Brow_D v. Allen, supra;
Akins v. Te~~ supra; MontoE v. PeQ.E.l_~ supra.
In Montoya, supra, the court held, when no
person with a Spanish-sounding surname had served on a jury for several years, and when only 2
names on a jury list of 1600 had Spanish-sounding
surnames in a community of 17,000, 719 of which
had Spanish-sounding surnames, that this constituted
a prima facie case of discrimination, and ruled that
the jury which convicted the defendant was unconstitutionally selected and that the conviction could
not stand.
It is important to note that the courts have
consistently struck down systems which used, as a
basis for drawing jury lists, sources which had persons classified according to race. Norris v. Ala_Q~~
supra; Arnold v. North ~rolinil, supra; Whi!_us v.
Georgia, supra.
By analogy, just as a person of a different race
is distinquished by color, these Spanish names provide ready identification of the members of this
class. In selecting jurors, the jury commissioners
work from a list of names and, while one cannot
change the names, the courts should take extra precautions to insure that such names are not used as
a basis to discriminate either intentionally or unintentionally.
Out of 2318 names on the 1968 jury list,
approximately 14 are names of persons of the Negro
race (H.T.125). This is in light of the fact that only
about 2% of the population of Weber County is of
that race, and only about 2Y2 per cent of the popu-

20

lation of Ogden City is of that race (H.T. 28,37).
In contrast, only six persons with Spanish American
sounding surnames appeared on the 1968 jury list
(H. T. 107) despite the fact that it is estimated that
10% of the residents of Ogden City have Spanishsounding surnames and that approximately 5% of
the population of Weber County is of Spanish
American ancestry.
The defendant asserts that, in light of the above
analysis, persons of Spanish American ancestry are
being discriminated against in the drawing of jury
lists in Weber County, thus rendering any jury
selected unconstitutional. As a result, any conviction handed down by such a jury cannot stand.

POINT IV
WHEN A JURY IS NOT DRAWN FROM A FAIR
CROSS SECTION OF THE COMMUNITY, PREJUDICE TO
THE DEFENDANT IS ASSUMED AND HIS CONVICTION
CANNOT ST AND REGARDLESS OF THE RACE OF THE
DEFENDANT.
A.

The defendant in the case at bar, a Negro, was prejudiced
by the method of jury selection in Weber County, and her
conviction must be set aside.
The courts have held that any jury selection system
wli1ch results in juries which are not drawn from a fair cross
section of the community infringe upon the defendant's con>titutional right of trial by jury, and that convictions by such
juries cannot stand. Passer v. CoUI!,t}'. Board, 171 Minn. 177,
'11 N.W. 545 (1927); Walter v. Stat~ 208 Ind. 231, 195
NE. 268 (1935); Unit~il._States v. Greenh_qg, 200 Fed. Supp.
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382 (U.S.D.C., S.D.N.Y., 1961); Rabinowitz v. \Lf!i.t_e_Q_St~~ 1,
supra.
In Passer, supra, the defendant, a man, challenged the
jury on the basis that women were unconstitutionally exclud
ed from jury service. The court in commenting on the right to
a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community stated
that:
When a jury is not chosen from a fair cross section of
the community, this right may not be legally denied,
and if it is denied we must presume that the defendant
was prejudiced thereby. 19 5 N .E. 271.
In Gree!!_berg, supra, the court stated:
The defendant here does not claim that any actual or
specific prejudice to him has resulted or will result from
the methods of selection which he attacks. But his right
to relief is not dependent upon the showing of prejudice
in his individual case. If as he claims, the list from which
his grand jury was drawn was made up in violation of
prescribed and accepted standards, then that in itself
would entitle him to relief. 200 Fed. Supp. 387.
The court went on in the same case to explain that exclusion of a racial group or economic or social class from jury
service deprived the jury system of the broad base that it was
designed to have in our democratic society and that such action operated to destroy the basic democratic nature and classlessness of jury personnel. The court further pointed out that
under such a system injury is not limited to the defendant but
that there was injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the community at large, and to the democratic
ideal reflected in the processes of our courts.
The 5th Circuit applied the same reasoning as the Green
berg court in Rabinowit~ v. United Sta~ supra, in which thr
defendant, a white girl, challenged the jury system on the
22

ciuL1nds the Negroes were excluded. The court upheld the
challenge and held:
Departure from statutory scheme depriving a jury system
nf the broad base it was designed by Congress to have
may be asserted by any litigant, even though he is not a
member of the excluded class. 366 F.2d 37.
See also United_~ates v. Denn_is, 183 F. 2d 201 (U.S.C.A.

Cir. 1950), in which Judge Learned Hand, in commenting
rhe right of the defendant to challenge a jury on the basis
rlur it was not drawn from a fair cross section of the community, stated:
~11d

0 11

That any party to a suit, civil or criminal, is entitled to
have the particular panel which tries his case, drawn at
random from a list which is not unlawfully weighted, and
that he may complain even though he has not shown that
the imbalance has prejudiced him. 183 F. 2d 216.
The defendant in the case at bar was guaranteed a right
trial by jury by Section 77-1-8, Utah Code Annotated
1953). Such a right comtemplates trial by a jury drawn from
" tau cross section of the community.
ru

The jury commissioners have deprived the defendant of
!1u constitutional rights by drawing jury lists exclusively from
"ilters whose names appear on the real property index and by
,Jiscriminating against persons of Spanish American ancestry.
!he result is that the constitutional rights of the defendant
have been prejudiced and her conviction cannot stand.
!l.
<1

The prosecution in the case at bar must show beyond
reasonable doubt that the prejudice to the defendant was

11,irmlc,~.

In 1961 the Supreme Court of Utah held that to require
1111urs to take a test to qualify as jurors was error, but that
23

such error was harmless and therefore did not require a re
versal. ~ate v. Do~, supra. However, the court pointed out
that the result would have been different had the defendant
shown that such a requirement resulted in a jury which wa,
not drawn from a cross section of the community.
In the case at bar the defendant has shown that the jury
system as it operates in Weber County results in a jury which
1s not drawn from a fair cross section of the community.
Recently the United States Supreme Court in two different cases has indicated what test is to be applied in determining if the denial of a constitutional right constitutes harmless
error. Fai}y v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 11 L.Ed. 2d 171, 84
S.Ct. 229 (1963); Chap_man v. QilifQTBg, 386 U.S. 18, 17
L.Ed. 2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824 (1966).
In Fahy, supra the court stated that the test was:
... whether there is a reasonable possibility that the
evidence complained of may have contributed to the
conviction. 375 U.S. 86-87.
Subsequently, in Ch'!J'_!!lan. supra, the court clarified its
holding in F ah_y, stating:
That before a constitutional error can be held harmless.
the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 386 U.S. 25, 17 L.Ed.
2d 710.
The defendant in the case at bar was guaranteed a trial
by a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community.
and the question of whether the denial of this right was harmless error would have to be decided according to the test laid
down above by the Supreme Court. The burden is on the prosecution to show that prejudice to the defendant in the case at
bar was harmless. Ch~_ill_an v. <:-:_~ifo_Qlia, supra. The defendant
24

,•.crt> that the prosecution did not and can not sustain this
hl;' den and that her conviction must be set aside.

,1

CONCLUSION

By limiting the jury selection process to those persons
1.. 1i 0 own real property and who voted in the last general
election, the jury commissioners have discriminated against
rlic poor, the minority groups, and those other qualified
pmons who did not exercise their franchise in the last general
election. Consequently, the jury which tried Dorothy Beasley
w.ls not drawn from a fair cross section of the community,
and prejudice to her is assumed. Her conviction must be set
Jjde.

Respectfully submitted,
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